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Contemporary research on civil war has largely dismissed the role of political and economicgrievances, focusing instead on opportunities for conflict. However, these strong claims rest onquestionable theoretical and empirical grounds. Whereas scholars have examined primarily the
relationship between individual inequality and conflict, we argue that horizontal inequalities between
politically relevant ethnic groups and states at large can promote ethnonationalist conflict. Extending
the empirical scope to the entire world, this article introduces a new spatial method that combines our
newly geocoded data on ethnic groups’ settlement areas with spatial wealth estimates. Based on these
methodological advances, we find that, in highly unequal societies, both rich and poor groups fight more
often than those groups whose wealth lies closer to the country average. Our results remain robust to a
number of alternative sample definitions and specifications.
A lthough logistical and power-relatedconditions—such as low state-level per capitaincome, weak state institutions, and peripheral
and inaccessible territory—enjoy near-consensus sup-
port as explanations of civil war onset, most of the
contemporary literature regards explanations rooted
in political and economic grievances with suspicion
(Blattman and Miguel 2010). In fact, the debate over
the status of grievances in such explanations dates
back at least to the 1960s, with the introduction of
relative deprivation theory. Inspired by psychological
theories of conflict, Gurr (1970) and his colleagues
argued that economic and other types of inequality
increase the risk of internal strife through frustrated
expectations. In contrast, today’s most influential
quantitative studies of civil war give short shrift
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to grievance-based accounts, based on reports that
unequal individual wealth distributions have no
statistically distinguishable relationship to internal
conflict (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and
Laitin 2003).
Yet, despite these alleged nonfindings, the debate
over grievances is far from dead. Indeed, inequality
continues to occupy a prominent place in the qual-
itative literature on civil wars and has repeatedly
been linked to conflict processes (Sambanis 2005, 323;
Stewart 2008b; Wood 2003). Moreover, in the last few
years, some quantitative studies have started to appear
that argue that the current literature’s failure to con-
nect distributional asymmetries with conflict behavior
may actually be due to inappropriate conceptualization
and imperfect measurements, rather than reflecting a
fundamental absence of any causal effect (Østby 2008b;
see also Stewart 2008b).
Also relying on quantitative evidence, we join these
recent contributions in shifting the explanatory focus
from individualist to group-level accounts of inequal-
ity and conflict. Because formidable problems of data
availability associated with the uneven coverage and
comparability of surveys have stood in the way of
assessing such “horizontal inequalities” (HIs), most
scholars have had to content themselves with selective
case studies or statistical samples restricted to particu-
lar world regions.
To overcome these difficulties, we combine our
newly geocoded data on politically relevant ethnic
groups’ settlement areas with Nordhaus’s (2006) spa-
tial wealth measures, both with global coverage. Based
on this novel strategy, we present the first truly world-
wide comparison of horizontal inequality and ethnona-
tionalist civil wars. Controlling for political power ac-
cess, we show that both advanced and backward ethnic
groups are more likely to experience such conflict than
groups whose wealth lies closer to the national average.
Moreover, in agreement with a broad conception of
horizontal inequalities, we find that both political and
economic inequalities contribute to civil war. Extensive
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sensitivity analysis confirms that our findings are robust
to various model specifications, alternative inequality
measures, and sample definitions.
We proceed as follows: First, we review the extensive
literature on inequality and conflict before narrowing
down the scope to our own theoretical framework,
which connects HIs with collective violence through
grievance-based mechanisms. Based on this approach,
we derive our main hypotheses on the effect of HIs
on civil war onset. To test the hypotheses, we then
introduce the datasets and describe our spatial method
of wealth estimation in detail, including how to use
the contours of the ethnic groups’ settlement areas as
“cookie cutters,” which allows us to extract the rel-
evant wealth estimates from the spatial wealth map.
After specifying the variables used in our empirical
analysis, we then expose the hypotheses to systematic
tests in the main models, followed by another section
that assesses the robustness of our findings. Finally,
concluding at least tentatively that both economic and
political inequality at the group level increase the risk
of ethnonationalist civil war, we argue that the civil
war literature’s tendency to downplay the importance
of grievances as a source of internal conflict is both
premature and misguided.
INEQUALITY IN THE CIVIL WAR
LITERATURE
Intimately related to issues of power and wealth dis-
tribution in society, inequality plays a central role in
classical theories of conflict. In an influential article,
Davies (1962) argued that revolutions were motivated
by frustration resulting from an evolving gap between
individual aspirations and actual economic status. Also
adopting an explicitly psychological perspective, Gurr’s
(1970) well-known theory of relative deprivation char-
acterizes various types of collective violence as reac-
tions to frustrations stemming from unfulfilled aspira-
tions, usually related to material well-being (see review
in Brush 1996). Such a perspective differs radically
from earlier sociological theories of mob behavior that
explained collective violence as a societal pathology
(e.g., Le Bon 1913). Instead, relative deprivation theo-
rists argue that individuals’ widespread discontent with
their social situation triggers conflict, especially where
modernization fuels a “revolution of rising expecta-
tions” (Davies 1962).
Although related indirectly to inequality through
this psychological mechanism, relative deprivation the-
ory does not explicitly focus on interpersonal or inter-
group wealth comparisons (Hogg and Abrams 1988;
Regan and Norton 2005; cf. Gurr and Duvall 1973).
Other theories adopt a structural perspective, linking
various types of inequality explicitly to structural im-
balances in society, such as uneven income or land dis-
tribution (Acemog˘lu and Robinson 2005; Muller 1985;
Muller and Seligson 1987; Russett 1964). Partly un-
der the inspiration of Marxist principles, the literature
on peasant rebellions explains violent collective action
as a response to unequal wealth allocation (Moore
1966; Scott 1976). Frustrated with their lot, the peasant
masses and other underprivileged groups are expected
to take up arms as a way to seize power and redistribute
wealth in their favor.
Relative deprivation theory remains perhaps the
most prominent explanation that connects grievances
with conflict, but has a very mixed record as regards em-
pirical evidence (Brush 1996; Oberschall 1978). Early
on, the theory attracted criticism from Snyder and
Tilly (1972), who argued that opportunity-based mobi-
lization rather than grievances causes internal conflict
and revolutions. Contending that all societies contain
a number of aggrieved and frustrated individuals, they
did not think “there is any general connection between
collective violence and hardship such that an observer
could predict one from the other” (Tilly 1972, 520; see
also Skocpol 1979; Tilly 1978). Along similar lines, a
series of studies challenged the results pertaining to
income inequality, which was usually seen as closely
connected to the notion of relative deprivation (see,
e.g., Weede 1987). By the end of the 1980s, the de-
bate remained unresolved, with virtually all possible
causal connections—negative, positive, curvilinear, or
none—being represented in the literature (Lichbach
1989).
As the end of the Cold War brought with it a new
wave of conflict, most of which was ethnonationally
motivated, Gurr (1993, 2000a, 2000b) extended his
previous theory and began to study ethnic minorities’
reactions to state-imposed disadvantages and discrim-
ination. In agreement with Horowitz’ (1985) seminal
study of ethnic groups in conflict, Gurr found that
ethnic grievances contributed indirectly to collective
violence through ethnic mobilization.
In contrast, the contemporary civil war literature has
been pioneered by scholars who take issue with such
reasoning. Positioning themselves explicitly against
grievance-based theories in political science and sociol-
ogy, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) follow in the footsteps
of earlier critics of relative deprivation (although with-
out referring to them explicitly). Very much as Snyder
and Tilly had done three decades earlier, Collier and
Hoeffler (2004, 564) point to the ubiquity of frustra-
tion around the world, asserting that this fact deprives
the theory of explanatory value: “Misperceptions of
grievances may be very common: All societies may
have groups with exaggerated grievances. In this case,
as with greed-rebellion, motive would not explain the
incidence of rebellion.” Explicitly classifying inequali-
ties as grievance-related indicators, these authors rely
on the Gini coefficient to measure the income distri-
bution among individuals. Having found no statistical
effect for this and other hardship proxies, Collier and
Hoeffler feel vindicated in their wholesale rejection of
grievances and inequality as causes of civil war. In his
best-selling book The Bottom Billion, Collier (2007, 18)
confirms these doubts:
So what causes civil war? Rebel movements themselves
justify their actions in terms of a catalogue of grievances:
repression, exploitation, exclusion. Politically motivated
academics have piled in with their own hobbyhorses, which
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usually cast rebels as heroes. I have come to distrust this
discourse of grievances as self-serving.1
In another influential study that stresses political
and institutional causes of civil war, Fearon and Laitin
(2003) present findings that cast doubt on ethnic and
political grievances as explanations of conflict onset.
Like Collier and Hoeffler, Fearon and Laitin rely on
a series of individual-level statistical proxies, includ-
ing the Gini coefficient, which provide no evidence
of economic inequality increasing the risk of conflict.
Summing up these and other studies, Laitin (2007, 23)
concludes that
ethnic grievances are commonly felt and latent; the factors
that make these grievances vital and manifest differentiate
the violent from the nonviolent cases. Ex ante measures of
grievance levels are not good predictors of the transforma-
tion of latent grievances into manifest ones. And it is the
factors that turn latent grievances into violent action that
should be considered as explanatory for that violence.
Despite these negative findings, a number of schol-
ars find the rejection of grievances and inequalities
premature. Although the poor quality of distributional
economic data within and across countries should per-
haps be reason for pause by itself,2 the main reason
that grievance-based arguments cannot be so easily re-
jected is that these studies largely miss their theoretical
target. Insisting that conflict-inducing inequality can-
not be reduced to household-level measures of income
distribution such as the Gini coefficient, Cramer (2003)
calls for an alternative that is explicitly relational and
theoretically grounded.3 In the concluding chapter of a
two-volume compilation of case studies testing Collier
and Hoeffler’s (2004) model, Sambanis (2005) draws
the same inference. Noting that there is a major dis-
crepancy between the quantitative nonfinding and the
repeated references to inequality in the case studies,
Sambanis (2005, 324) considers a number of explana-
tions, including problems relating to interpretation and
sampling of case evidence, as well as the fundamental
issue of aggregation level:
There may exist a relationship between inequality and
popular revolutions or class conflict, which is another rea-
son to consider disaggregating the cases of civil war. But
ethnic or secessionist wars should, in theory, be driven
more by group-based inequality . . . than by interpersonal
inequality.
A more promising way to capture the link between
uneven wealth distributions and conflict has been pro-
posed by Stewart (2008b) and her colleagues, who
1 In more recent research, Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009)
maintain that civil wars are caused by factors associated with “feasi-
bility” rather than by grievances and other types of motivations.
2 Using a different conceptualization of vertical inequality condi-
tioned on factor mobility, Boix (2008) reports a strong effect on
internal conflict.
3 Likewise arguing against misplaced individualism, Cederman and
Girardin (2007) criticize the use of the ethnolinguistic fractionaliza-
tion index as a general proxy for ethnonationalist frustration.
contrast vertical, or individual-level inequalities, with
horizontal inequalities. Defining the latter as “inequal-
ities in economic, social or political dimensions or cul-
tural status between culturally defined groups,” Stew-
art (2008a, 3) argues that to a large extent, scholars
have failed to find evidence of inequality’s war-causing
effect because of their reliance on individualist, rather
than group-based, measures of income and power dif-
ferences:
But the majority of internal conflicts are organized group
conflicts—they are neither exclusively nor primarily a mat-
ter of individuals committing acts of violence against oth-
ers. What is most often involved is group mobilization of
people with particular shared identities or goals to attack
others in the name of the group. (Stewart 2008a, 11)
Following the lead of Horowitz and Gurr, Stewart
(2008a) conceptualizes horizontal inequality broadly
by considering political, economic, social, and cultural
dimensions explicitly. Political HIs entail blocked or
limited access to central decision-making authority
within the state. The economic dimension taps the dis-
tribution of wealth among households. Social HI mea-
sures primarily groups’ uneven social access, for exam-
ple, in terms of education and societal status. Finally,
the cultural aspect captures group-level inequalities
with respect to cultural policies and symbols, including
national holidays and religious rights.
Recognizing the difficulties of measuring HIs, Stew-
art’s team has so far primarily relied on case stud-
ies rather than large-N comparisons. The picture that
emerges from this research suggests that both disad-
vantaged and advanced groups have a higher likeli-
hood of getting involved in internal conflict than groups
closer to the country average (Stewart 2008b). Yet
some quantitative researchers have attempted to gen-
eralize from the case studies to a larger set of countries.
In a pioneering statistical test, Barrows (1976) detected
an influence of group-level differences on conflict in
sub-Saharan Africa. Relying on household surveys
conducted in 39 developing countries, Østby (2008b)
finds evidence that social horizontal inequality causes
civil war, although the economic dimension appears
to be weaker (see also Østby 2008a). In a follow-up
study based on geocoded conflict and survey data from
sub-Saharan Africa, Østby, Norda˚s, and Rød (2009)
reach firmer conclusions, showing that both economic
and social group-level differences are likely drivers of
conflict behavior.
THEORIZING HORIZONTAL INEQUALITIES
We now turn to our own account of inequality and
conflict. The starting point of our approach to ethnona-
tionalist warfare is the realization that ethnic groups
find themselves in radically different situations for var-
ious historical reasons. Whereas some ethnic groups
came out on top of the geopolitical game, others were
conquered early on, and therefore lost out in the com-
petition for wealth and influence. Moreover, the un-
even spread of nationalism delayed mass-level political
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mobilization in many parts of the world, thus creating
differences in both economic and political develop-
ment that were often exploited by alien rulers (Gellner
1964). As argued by Tilly (1999), nationalism can be
thought of as a case of “categorical inequality” because
it asserts and creates paired and unequal categories, either
(a) rival aspirants to nationhood or (b) members of the
authentic nation versus others. It involves claims to prior
control over a state, hence to the exclusion of others from
that priority. It authorizes agents of the nation to subor-
dinate, segregate, stigmatize, expel, or even exterminate
others in the nation’s name. (172)
Adopting Stewart’s definition of HI, we focus on the
political and economic dimensions of HI.4 Although
these two types of inequality are often likely to be
related, we follow Stewart in treating the distribu-
tion of power and of wealth as conceptually separate
components. Previous quantitative research has exam-
ined the role of political exclusion of ethnic groups on
the risk of civil war, but has not considered explicitly
the economic aspect of exclusion and the relationship
between the two (see e.g., Cederman, Buhaug, and
Rød 2009; Cederman and Girardin 2007; Cederman,
Wimmer, and Min 2010; though see Gurr 1993, 2000b).
By contrast, some critics of the role of ethnicity, such
as Woodward (1995), argue that alleged ethnic conflicts
are really driven by underlying economic inequalities
that lead ethnic identities to become politicized. A
strong version of this argument would hold that ethnic
political inequalities are irrelevant in the absence of
economic inequalities.
Building on our previous work, we view HIs as struc-
tural asymmetries that make ethnonationalist civil war
more likely and adopt an indirect research strategy that
explains the effect of inequality by postulating a set of
causal mechanisms. To close the gap between the struc-
tural background conditions and behavioral patterns,
we propose intermediate analytical steps.5 First, we
postulate that objective political and economic asym-
metries can be transformed into grievances through a
process of group comparison driven by collective emo-
tions. Second, we argue that such grievances trigger
violent collective action through a process of group
mobilization.
From Horizontal Inequalities to Grievances
As opposed to objective conditions such as horizontal
inequalities, grievances are intersubjectively perceived
phenomena. As we have noted earlier in the text, this
makes them very hard to measure, but we can draw
on an extensive experimentally supported literature
4 As we have seen, HIs also involve social and cultural policies (see
Stewart 2008a). We acknowledge that these aspects may be linked to
conflict, but these conflict mechanisms fall outside the scope of this
article.
5 See Gurr (2000b, Chap. 3) for a similar theory based on four
conditions, namely the salience of ethnocultural identity, collective
incentives for action, collective-action capacity, and environmental
opportunities.
in social psychology as a way to construct plausible
mechanisms connecting structural asymmetries with
collective violence. Obviously, it may be possible to find
ways to connect HIs with conflict through causal mech-
anisms that do not feature grievances, but we leave this
possibility to other researchers to explore.6
Before grievances can be acted upon, they need to
be cognitively linked to social identities through self-
categorization (Hogg and Abrams 1988, 21). Clearly
the salience of ethnic distinctions varies over time and
from case to case (Gurr 2000b), but once group iden-
tities become salient, members of the involved groups
are prone to make social comparisons that hinge on the
distinction between in-group and out-group categories
(Turner 1981). According to “realistic conflict theory,”
conflicting claims to scarce resources, including power,
prestige, and wealth, are likely to produce ethnocen-
tric and antagonistic intergroup relations (Tajfel and
Turner 1979). In stratified social systems, social compar-
ison reflecting superiority or inferiority should be es-
pecially likely to trigger conflict (see Horowitz 1985).7
These processes of social comparison and intergroup
evaluation are far from emotionally neutral. As argued
by Kalyvas (2006) and Petersen (2002), attempts to
reduce the violent excesses of civil wars to entirely
calculative and cognitive processes fly in the face of
countless testimonies of the emotional escalation pro-
cesses leading to the outbreak of collective violence.8
In particular, violations of norms of justice and equal-
ity will typically arouse feelings of anger and resent-
ment among members of the disadvantaged group.9
As observed in a pioneering study by T. H. Marshall,
such emotional responses are present in class systems,
which “are based structurally on chronic asymmetries
of power and reward” (Barbalet 1992, 153).
What is true for cases of class resentment also ap-
plies to inequalities among ethnic groups. In agreement
with Petersen (2002), we postulate that resentment
based on intergroup comparisons involving HIs often
6 It should be noted that the presence of HIs presupposes the ex-
istence of well-defined groups (Stewart 2000), which is not a trivial
precondition (e.g., Kalyvas 2006). Although it is undoubtedly true
that modern politics is to a large extent group-based, and social life
hinges on social categories (Gellner 1964; Hogg and Abrams 1988),
we argue that the extent to which cohesive groups can actually be
said to exist is ultimately a matter of empirical analysis. Yet, be-
cause our goal is to evaluate the conflict-inducing effect of HIs, we
join Horowitz (1985), Gurr (1993; 2000b) and others in adopting
a self-consciously group-based framework, although restricting our
substantive focus to groups defined through ethnic categorization
rather than through other cleavages.
7 In addition to such direct consequences of objective differences,
“social identity theory” tells us that mere awareness of social out-
groups may be sufficient to provoke competitive behavior even in the
absence of objective issues of contention (Tajfel and Turner 1979).
8 Indeed, although social identity theorists stress the cognitive com-
ponent of group behavior, they allow for an important element of
emotional engagement, as group membership is assumed to be inti-
mately associated with self-esteem (Hogg and Abrams 1988).
9 Modern sociological theories of emotions tell us that, contrary to
the views of early crowd theorists, and contrary to lingering popular
belief, emotions are not irrational, but serve distinctly goal-directed
purposes in social and political life (e.g., Emirbayer and Goldberg
2005; Petersen 2002).
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provokes ethnic mobilization. Inspired by Horowitz’s
(1985) “positional psychology,” Petersen explains that
“resentment is the feeling of being politically domi-
nated by a group that has no right to be in a supe-
rior position. It is the everyday experience of these
perceived status relations that breeds the emotion”
(40).
From Grievances to Collective Action
Clearly, emotions do not automatically trigger violent
behavior. Under some institutional circumstances, re-
dress can be sought through peaceful means (Hogg and
Abrams 1988). Yet most governmental incumbents will
only reluctantly abandon their advantaged positions
by sharing power or letting minorities secede. Without
resources and organization, anger alone can do little to
challenge powerful defenders of the status quo (Tilly
1978). Moreover, since Olson’s classic treatment of
the free-rider problem, we know that collective action
cannot be taken for granted, especially where the
costs incurred by volunteering individuals may be high
(Lichbach 1995). However, there are good reasons to
believe that the collective-action dilemma may have
been overstated in the context of civil wars. As con-
vincingly argued by Kalyvas and Kocher (2007), the
existence of a dilemma hinges on the questionable as-
sumption that participation in combat is costlier than
nonparticipation. Although armed conflict undoubt-
edly poses acute risks to members of rebel organiza-
tions, there is no guarantee that staying away from
the fighting is the safer option, especially where collat-
eral violence affects civilians more than combatants, or
where noncooperating civilians are at risk for targeted
punishment for nonparticipation.
Collective-action theorists may object that punish-
ment is also costly and should be subject to free riding,
but experimental evidence shows that individuals are
often more than willing to invest in costly punishment
of free riders and norm violators (Fehr and Ga¨chter
2000; see also references in Blattman and Miguel 2010).
Thanks to preexisting social networks, ethnic groups
may also provide organizational structure at the micro-
level that can be used to overcome free riding (Hechter
and Okamoto 2001). Moreover, a number of studies
show that collective identities, such as those constitut-
ing ethnic groups, facilitate collective action (e.g., Gates
2002; Simpson and Macy 2004).
Even though organizational and cognitive factors
are central to mobilization, it would be a mis-
take to overlook the contribution of emotionally
charged grievances. Indeed, “emotional ties and invest-
ments are a potential source of power in their own
right, alongside social-structural sources of power”
(Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005, 507). As we have seen,
the perception of injustice generates grievances that
serve as a formidable tool of recruitment. In addi-
tion, detailed studies of social movements, including
those that fight civil wars, demonstrate that “injustice
frames” play a central role in mobilization processes
and are reflected in organizations’ media messages
and grassroots participants’ justifications of action
(Gamson 1992). Thus, rather than classifying inequality
as a pure “grievance” factor, we view its impact as a
mobilizational resource.
DERIVING TESTABLE HYPOTHESES
ON HORIZONTAL INEQUALITIES
AND CIVIL WAR
Having postulated our causal mechanisms, we now re-
turn to the macro-level to perform the actual empirical
analysis. It is in principle possible to measure directly
grievances (Petersen 2002) and to trace mobilization
processes (e.g., Beissinger 2002), but such detailed
analysis is beyond the scope of the current study. As will
become clear later, collecting and evaluating structural
data on economic HIs is a major challenge in its own
right.
What are the observable implications of our analyti-
cal framework? The first, and most obvious, hypothesis
expects a positive effect of economic HIs on civil war
onset. If the causal chain operates as we have postu-
lated, there should be a statistically discernible signal
indicating that ethnic groups with GDP per capita far
from a country’s average have a higher risk of experi-
encing conflict:
H1. Economic HIs increase the likelihood of civil war.
However, as we have seen, an uneven wealth dis-
tribution is not the only possible type of structural
asymmetry. Drawing on Stewart’s multidimensional
conceptualization of HIs, we hypothesize that both
economic and political HIs contribute jointly to the
outbreak of civil war. Even controlling for political HIs,
such as groups’ exclusion from political power, income
inequalities among ethnic groups should increase the
risk of civil war. These theoretical expectations dove-
tail with Stewart’s (2008a, 18) hypothesis that “political
mobilization is especially likely when there are consis-
tent HIs, that is both political and economic HIs run
in the same direction.” Based on statistical evidence
from sub-Saharan Africa, Østby (2008b) finds support
for a strong effect of interaction between interregional
asset inequality and political exclusion. Case studies
of Coˆte d’Ivoire (Langer 2005) and Nepal (Murshed
and Gates 2005) confirm this finding (see also Stewart,
Brown, and Langer 2008, 289–90; cf. Hegre, Østby, and
Raleigh 2009).10 Our second hypothesis summarizes
these theoretical expectations:
H2. Economic and political HIs both increase the likeli-
hood of civil war.
So far, we have not differentiated between advanced
and backward groups’ conflict-proneness. As Horowitz
10 See also Hechter’s (1975) notion of “internal colonialism.”
Hechter argues that economically peripheral ethnic groups are less
likely to become integrated in larger nation states and more likely to
maintain or reinforce separate identities.
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(1985) explains, arguments can be advanced for both
types of economic HIs leading to a higher risk of con-
flict. Poorer groups, especially those residing in back-
ward and peripheral regions, often desire to break away
from the cores of their countries regardless of the cost,
because they perceive themselves to be systematically
disadvantaged compared to their wealthier compatri-
ots in terms of economic development and distribution
of public goods. Perceptions of disadvantage also char-
acterize members of some relatively wealthy groups,
especially if they feel that state-level redistribution
denies them the fruits of their success: “Advantaged
regions usually generate more income and contribute
more revenue to the treasury of the undivided state
than they receive. They believe that they are subsidiz-
ing poorer regions” (Horowitz 1985, 249–50). Because
these groups have more to lose, and are sometimes
demographically represented outside their original set-
tlement areas, however, they can be more cost-sensitive
as regards secession, but such cases do occur, as illus-
trated by Slovenia and Croatia (cf. Gourevitch 1979).
Nevertheless, there is no reason to assume that the ef-
fect of group inequality is perfectly symmetric around
relative equality. Remaining agnostic as to the relative
frequency of HIs in either direction, we therefore sub-
mit these arguments to separate tests by dividing H1
into two subhypotheses:
H1a. Relatively poor ethnic groups are more likely to ex-
perience civil war.
H1b. Relatively wealthy ethnic groups are more likely to
experience civil war.
GLOBAL DATA ON HORIZONTAL
INEQUALITIES AND OTHER DIMENSIONS
Our theoretical expectations must now be confronted
with empirical evidence. As we have seen, data avail-
ability constitutes a major stumbling block in studies
of inequality and conflict. So far, virtually all exist-
ing statistical studies of HIs have used survey data on
economic welfare by households, as collected by the
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) project.11
Although these data offer a relatively direct measure
of well-being, and are therefore useful as grievance
indicators, the information source and survey approach
are associated with a number of practical limitations.
The DHS project is limited to a selection primarily
of developing countries, and information on ethnic af-
filiation or the geographic location of households is
only available in some of the surveys.12 Although the
surveys are constructed to be nationally representative,
the number of responses for an ethnic group or loca-
tion may often be very low, and there is no guarantee
that the samples will be representative. Finally, survey
11 For these data, see http://www.measuredhs.com/.
12 See, e.g., Baldwin and Huber (2010), who draw on survey data
from 46 countries to evaluate the impact of ethnic diversity on public
goods provision. As noted earlier, Østby (2008a, 2008b) also uses
survey data in her studies of HIs and conflict in sub-Saharan Africa
(see also Østby, Norda˚s, and Rød 2009).
data are subject to a host of potential response biases,
both conscious and unconscious. For example, aggre-
gate responses from surveys may well be systematically
biased against finding evidence of inequality if poorer
individuals overstate their assets and richer individuals
consistently understate theirs. In sum, survey data may
be helpful for many purposes, but the DHS data do not
provide a plausible alternative for evaluating the role
of horizontal inequalities on a global basis.
Given these difficulties, it makes sense to consider
spatial datasets as an alternative to survey-based meth-
ods. In fact, the only broadly available cross-national
data source on variation in wealth within countries is
the G-Econ data, developed by Nordhaus (2006; see
also Nordhaus and Chen 2009).13 The G-Econ dataset
tries to assemble the best available data on local
economic activity within countries for geographical
grid cells, and convert these to comparable figures in
purchasing power parity to allow meaningful compar-
isons. The resolution of the spatially explicit data set is
1◦ grid cells. The data are constructed from a variety
of sources, including regional gross product data for
the lowest available political subdivision, estimates
of regional income by industry, and estimates of
rural population and agricultural income. The specific
methodologies differ by countries and data availability
(see Nordhaus et al. 2006 for a detailed discussion).
The database has global coverage, but the temporal
scope is limited to a single year, 1990.14 We therefore
restrict our analysis to the post–Cold War period,
although we present supplementary results extending
back to 1946 in the sensitivity analysis that follows.
Because it is well known that relative inequality,
as opposed to absolute wealth, is characterized by
considerable inertia, these assumptions would seem
plausible (Stewart and Langer 2008; Tilly 1999).15
Despite their relatively broad coverage, there are
a number of disadvantages to the Nordhaus data for
testing propositions on HIs. Any measure of the value
of economic production is strictly speaking a “flow”
measure and hence an imperfect proxy for the “stock”
of wealth, although this criticism obviously applies with
equal force to national-level productivity measures.
Because the quality varies considerably across coun-
tries, the data are likely to understate the extent of in-
equality in countries with poor data coverage. Indeed,
in some countries the official data may be of such poor
quality that the variance is suppressed and accuracies
13 Another promising avenue is to use light emissions as a proxy for
economic activity; see, e.g., Min (2008). Chen and Nordhaus (2010)
report that the usefulness of this data source may be mostly limited
to cases where official statistics are especially poor.
14 G-Econ 2.2 provides separate estimates for gross cell products in
1995 and 2000. A closer inspection of the documentation (see Chen
2008), however, indicates that these estimates simply adjust the 1990
estimates for updated population figures for 1995 and 2000. As such,
the 1995 and 2000 figures contain no independent economic data
over the 1990 values.
15 Time-varying data from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset
and time series on the relative wealth of Yugoslav and Indian
regions confirm that this is a reasonable assumption. See Sec-
tion 1.5 of the supplemental online Appendix, available at http://
www.journals.cambridge.org/psr2011010.
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of survey reports may be questionable. We will return
to these issues in the section on sensitivity analyses.
Based on the G-Econ data, Buhaug et al. (n.d.)
present the first global results on the relationship
between spatial inequalities and civil war violence.
However, their research design focuses on local mea-
sures of inequality across geographic grid cells and the
specific locations where conflict first breaks out, and
does not capture group-level participation or wealth
differences. Another useful approach estimates the
wealth of regional subunits of states (Sambanis and
Milanovic 2009). A more direct assessment of HIs re-
quires geocoded data on ethnic groups, and in view
of H2, also information about their access to executive
power. Fortunately, the Ethnic Power Relations dataset
(EPR), together with its recent geocoded extension,
GeoEPR, fulfills these requirements.
The EPR dataset identifies all politically relevant
ethnic groups around the world and measures how ac-
cess to state power differs among them in all years from
1946 to 2005 (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010).
Based on an online expert survey, the sample includes
733 politically relevant ethnic groups in 155 sovereign
states.16 The coding rules define as politically relevant
all ethnic groups for which at least one political or-
ganization exists that promotes an ethnically oriented
agenda in the national political arena, or ethnic groups
that are subject to political discrimination. This dataset
improves significantly on previous efforts to code eth-
nic groups’ access to power, such as the Minorities at
Risk (MAR) dataset (Gurr 1993), which restricts the
sample to mobilized and/or discriminated-against mi-
norities and thus largely overlooks the ethnopolitical
constellation of power at the center, and Cederman
and Girardin (2007), who rely on preliminary, static
measures of the political status of ethnic groups and
limit their sample to Eurasia and North Africa.
Because the politically relevant groups and their ac-
cess to political power may change over time, the EPR
dataset provides separate coding for subperiods from
1946 to 2005. For each such time period, the demo-
graphic size and access to power enjoyed by repre-
sentatives of an ethnic group are specified. Focusing
on executive power only, i.e., representation in the
presidency, the cabinet, and senior posts in the ad-
ministration, including the army, the coding rules cate-
gorize all politically relevant ethnic groups according
to whether (1) their representatives enjoyed absolute
power through monopoly or a dominant position in the
executive branch,17 (2) they shared power with other
16 The dataset includes all 155 sovereign states with a population of
at least 1 million and a surface area of at least 5,000 square kilometers
as of 2005. Countries in which no meaningful ethnic cleavage exists in
national politics were coded as having no politically relevant ethnic
groups and are thus not included in the group-level sample used
in this article. See http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/epr. An updated
version of the EPR and GeoEPR datasets valid through 2009 will be
made available at http://www.icr.ethz.ch/data.
17 As opposed to Monopoly, which excludes any executive represen-
tation of other groups, Dominance applies to situations where elite
members of the group hold dominant power in the executive but
there is some limited inclusion of “token” members of other groups.
groups in a junior or senior role,18 or (3) they were ex-
cluded altogether from executive decision making but
enjoyed regional or separatist autonomy, or were pow-
erless or discriminated against.19 In our analysis that
follows, we drop category 1, because according to our
conflict coding, dominant and monopoly groups cannot
by definition stage rebellions against themselves, and
base the dummy variable of exclusion on the difference
between categories 2 and 3.
To obtain spatial estimates of economic performance
for EPR groups based on the Nordhaus grid, we need
information on their settlement areas or regions. Be-
cause this overlay operation requires data on the pre-
cise extent of these regions rather than a simple textual
description, existing datasets such as Minorities at Risk
(Gurr 1993) are insufficient. We therefore rely on the
recently completed GeoEPR dataset, a comprehensive
geocoded version of the EPR groups (Wucherpfennig
et al. n.d.). GeoEPR provides two types of informa-
tion about ethnic groups. First, for each group in EPR,
the dataset categorizes the type of settlement pattern,
distinguishing between regional, urban, and migrant
groups (plus mixed categories). For all groups with re-
gional bases, GeoEPR represents the settlement area
of a group as a polygon (or a set of polygons, if there is
more than one group region in a country). In contrast to
earlier geocoding attempts, GeoEPR also tracks major
changes in the settlement pattern of a group over time,
including those resulting from ethnic cleansing.
Our analysis requires conflict coding at the group
level. Because groups as a whole typically do not par-
ticipate in conflict (e.g., Kalyvas 2006), we use a re-
fined procedure that codes whether a group has links
to a rebel organization that was actively involved in
fighting. These new data represent an improvement
on previous group-level conflict coding used with the
EPR data (cf. Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010).
More precisely, we code our dependent variable as “1”
if a rebel organization expresses its political aims (at
least partly) in the name of the group and a significant
number of members of the group were participating
in the conflict. For a full sample of rebel groups and
their conflict involvement, we rely on the Non-State
Actors dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan
2009) that identifies the fighting organizations involved
in civil wars (according to the Uppsala/PRIO Armed
Conflicts Data, see Gleditsch et al. 2002). The link be-
tween these organizations and our EPR groups is pro-
vided by NSA2EPR, a new conflict resource that iden-
tifies organizations fighting for, and recruiting from,
particular EPR groups. We provide a list of the conflict
onset cases in the article.
18 A group is classified as playing a Senior or Junior role in a power-
sharing regime depending on the relative importance of the positions
controlled by group representatives.
19 Regional Autonomy applies if the group is excluded but enjoys au-
tonomous power at the regional level granted by the government. In
the case of Separatist Autonomy, the group has unilaterally declared
autonomy in opposition to the center. Powerless groups hold no
political power at either the national or regional level. Discriminated-
against groups are not only excluded but also subjected to targeted
discrimination with the intent of excluding them from power.
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FIGURE 1. G-Econ Cells for Yugoslavia,
Overlaid with GeoEPR Group Polygons for
Slovenes and Albanians
Note: The darker the shading, the wealthier the cells.
DERIVING OPERATIONAL MEASURES
The G-Econ data allow deriving ethnic group–specific
measures of wealth by overlaying polygons indicating
group settlement areas with the cells in the Nordhaus
data. Dividing the total sum of the economic produc-
tion in the settlement area by the group’s population
size enables us to derive group-specific measures of per
capita economic production, which can be compared
to either the nationwide per capita product or the per
capita product of privileged groups.
A visual illustration helps explain the estimation of
group GDP from Nordhaus data. Figure 1 shows the G-
Econ estimates as gray cells; darker shadings indicate
wealthier cells. The map shows the spatial variation in
wealth across the Yugoslav federation in 1990, based on
the CShapes dataset for the historical boundaries (Wei-
dmann, Kuse, and Gleditsch 2010). Relatively wealthy
pockets appear primarily in the northwest of the coun-
try, in the constituent republics of Slovenia and Croatia.
Compared to the other parts of the country, Serbia
shows up as a generally poor region.
Together with the settlement areas of GeoEPR, the
G-Econ data can now be used to estimate group wealth
spatially. Figure 1 also shows the settlement regions
for the Slovenes and the Albanians. Using techniques
similar to those pioneered in Cederman, Buhaug, and
Rød (2009), we derive an indicator of group wealth
by summing up the (population-weighted) propor-
tions of the Nordhaus cells covered by a group.20 For
20 This spatial aggregation process retrieves all the G-Econ cells
that are covered by a group polygon and computes the total wealth
FIGURE 2. Result of Spatial Wealth
Estimation for Groups in Yugoslavia
example, as a result of this procedure, the Slovenes get
a high score, because their settlement region is located
in the rich parts of Yugoslavia. Figure 2 shows hori-
zontal inequality for Yugoslavia, measured as the ratio
of the group’s GDP per capita estimate to the aver-
age value for the entire country, depicting wealthier
groups in darker shades and poorer ones in brighter
shades. Slovenes and Croats receive high scores, but
the opposite is true for the Albanians in Kosovo, which
are among the poorest groups in the country.
As a further illustration, Figure 3 shows the same
information for the Sudan. Unsurprisingly, the south-
ern and western groups, the latter including the Fur,
emerge as the most impoverished in that state. Ex-
tending the comparison to Myanmar, we also illus-
trate the limitations of our spatial approach (see
Figure 4). Despite considerable wealth discrepancies
between peripheral and central areas, the Nordhaus
data exhibit very limited variation, because of under-
lying data quality issues. To the extent that similar
measurement problems afflict other countries that
estimate as the sum of the cell values. However, in a number of
cases cells do not align perfectly with group polygons, and there
is only partial overlap between a cell and a group polygon. For
these cases, only the overlapping area’s wealth should enter the
group wealth computation. We estimate the wealth of a partial G-
Econ cell by distributing its total value as given in the dataset to
much finer cells of 2.5 arc-minutes (approximately 5 km, 1/24 of
the size of a G-Econ cell). This distribution is population-weighted;
i.e., it assumes that wealth is proportional to the number of peo-
ple in each of the smaller cells. This weighting was done using the
Gridded Population of the World dataset (Version 3, available at
http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/gpw/).
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FIGURE 3. Result of Spatial Wealth
Estimation for Groups in the Sudan
experienced conflict, we can expect the effect of in-
equality to be underestimated by our study.
As explained by Mancini, Stewart, and Brown
(2008), there are many different ways to operationalize
horizontal inequalities, most of which apply to entire
countries. In this article, we use two group-level mea-
sures of inequality, namely a symmetric logged form
(see H1) and an asymmetric, nonlogged form (see
H1a, 1b). The former indicator defines inequality as the
square of the logarithmized ratio between g, the GDP
per capita of the ethnic group, and G, the average GDP
per capita of all groups in the country:
lineq2 = [log(g/G)]2.
This definition captures deviations from the country av-
erage symmetrically and is zero for groups at the coun-
try average. As a complement to this symmetric indi-
cator, we also measure inequality asymmetrically with
two variables that correspond to groups that are poorer
and wealthier than the country average, respectively:
low ratio = G/g if g < G,
0 otherwise;
high ratio = g/G if g > G,
0 otherwise.
This operationalization guarantees that deviations
from the country mean are always positive numbers
greater than one. For example, a group that is twice as
FIGURE 4. Result of Spatial Wealth
Estimation for Groups in Myanmar
wealthy as the average has low_ratio = 0 and high_ratio
= 2, and a group that is three times poorer has low_ratio
= 3 and high_ratio = 0. See Table 1, which offers de-
scriptive statistics for these indicators and all other in-
dependent variables used in the analysis that follows.21
We use the nonspatial EPR dataset to derive vari-
ables capturing political HIs and group sizes. As we
have seen earlier, the EPR dataset provides a time-
varying indicator for groups’ exclusion from central
power. In addition, we measure the group’s demo-
graphic power balance with the ethnic group(s) in
power (EGIP) as its share of the dyadic population.22
We use a combination of the linear and squared terms
to capture the logic of bargaining theory, according to
which intermediate power levels are the most conflict-
prone, given that weaker groups stand no chance of
prevailing in contests, whereas stronger ones do not
necessarily have to resort to violence to get concessions
(see Wucherpfennig 2011).
At the country level, we control for GDP per capita,
based on nonspatial, time-varying statistics drawn from
21 We offer summary statistics for the restricted sample as used in
Models 2–9. For summary statistics based on the unrestricted sample,
see Section 1.6 in the supplemental online Appendix.
22 Formally, denoting the populations of the group and the EGIP as
s and S, respectively, the power balance is defined as s/(s+S) if the
group is excluded, and as s/S otherwise. Small groups thus have close
to a zero share of the dyadic population, whereas those groups that
are larger than the EGIP have a power balance greater than 0.5.
486
American Political Science Review Vol. 105, No. 3
TABLE 1. Summary Statistics for Independent Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Inequality (lineq) −0.067 0.303 −1.799 1.207
Inequality (lineq2) 0.096 0.291 0.000 3.238
Ineq. (low_ratio) 0.766 0.766 0.000 6.046
Ineq. (high_ratio) 0.496 0.614 0.000 3.344
Excluded 0.528 0.499 0.000 1.000
Power balance 0.248 0.262 0.000 1.000
Power balance (sq.) 0.130 0.222 0.000 1.000
GDP per capita (log) 7.944 1.060 5.231 10.494
No. excluded groups 8.405 13.706 0.000 46.000
Year 1998.093 4.300 1991.000 2005.000
Peace years 34.421 18.118 0.000 59.000
the Penn World Tables and World Bank sources, and
num_excl, the total number of excluded groups in the
country, as defined by EPR. Both measures should
have a negative impact on conflict probability. A large
number of studies find a negative association between
national GDP per capita and civil war onset (see Hegre
and Sambanis 2006). According to Walter’s (2006)
strategic argument, the num_excl variable can be ex-
pected to be negatively related to the risk of conflict,
because governments facing many ethnic groups fear
domino effects and will thus be less willing to make
concessions to single groups, as illustrated by Moscow’s
hard line in dealing with the Chechens’ claims. This
firmness can be expected to deter other groups from
challenging the government. In addition, we also con-
trol for the calendar year, because we anticipate a de-
clining trend in terms of conflict probability during the
Cold War, thanks to benign effects in the international
environment such as peaceful international norms and
institutions (Gurr 2000b). Finally, the models also con-
tain nonparametric corrections for temporal depen-
dence based on the peace_years variable, which mea-
sures the number of years a group has lived in peace,
as proposed by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998).23
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
We are now ready to present the results. Given the
limited temporal availability of inequality data, we re-
strict the sample to group years after the Cold War,
from 1991 through 2005. All groups represented in
GeoEPR are included, except the dispersed ones that
cover their respective countries’ entire territory. This
leaves us with about 450 groups per year or a total of
6,438 group years, with only 52 conflict onsets (see the
supplemental online Appendix available at http://www.
journals.cambridge.org/psr2011010). Unless otherwise
stated, our analysis therefore relies on rare-events logit
models. We compensate for country-level dependen-
cies by estimating clustered standard errors.
Table 2 presents the main results. Our starting point
is Model 1, which subjects the inequality hypothesis
23 This method also features three cubic splines.
H1 to a first test based on the lineq2 variable. The
result is both substantively and statistically significant,
suggesting that groups with wealth levels far from the
country average are indeed more likely to experience
civil war.24 Moreover, the other variables behave as
expected. The coefficients of the variables measuring
the demographic power balance point in the right di-
rection, but fail to reach statistical significance. At the
country level, both GDP per capita and calendar year
have strongly negative effects on the probability of con-
flict, as theoretically expected. The coefficient for the
variable capturing the number of ethnic groups is also
negative, but nowhere near statistical significance at
conventional levels. Finally, the temporal controls do
not seem to make much of a difference, but are retained
for comparative purposes.
To improve the precision of our inequality measures,
Model 2 discards ethnic groups with a spatially esti-
mated population less than 500,000. Although this cen-
soring limits the number of group-year observations to
3,967 and the conflict onsets to 42, we prefer to rely on
this specification.25 Our spatial method becomes unre-
liable for small population sizes, primarily because of
the low resolution of the G-Econ data and the limited
precision of the population estimates for tiny groups.26
Consequently, the group-size restriction almost triples
the inequality coefficient reported in Model 2 with-
out affecting the size of the standard error. Except for
this important change, there are few other surprises,
24 We refrain from including the nonsquared term, because its effect
cannot be separated from zero and should be nil according to H1.
25 This sample restriction drops a number of tiny groups, especially
in China and Russia, for which no reliable spatial estimate can be
computed. See also Section 1.6 in the supplemental online Appendix
for further details.
26 Although the lack of comparable group-level data makes it dif-
ficult to assess measurement error for the spatial GDP per capita
estimates, it is possible to compare the spatial group-size values with
those based on the EPR expert survey. By successively increasing the
lower size threshold, it can be established that 500,000 is the value
where the reduction in the standard deviation between spatial and
nonspatial flattens out, thus suggesting that this threshold is appro-
priate for population estimation. A further increase of the threshold
would lead to serious information loss, thus making it difficult to
discern the measured effect.
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TABLE 2. Explaining Onset of Group-level Conflict
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Group-level variables
Inequality (lineq2) 0.6661∗∗ 1.7463∗∗∗ 1.7342∗∗∗
(0.2402) (0.2484) (0.2641)
Inequality (smooth) 1.948∗∗∗
Ineq. (low_ratio) 1.1255∗∗∗
(0.1792)
Ineq. (high_ratio) 1.0875∗∗∗
(0.2305)
Excluded 1.1680∗∗ 1.241∗∗ 1.2066∗∗
(0.3394) (0.3905) (0.3702)
Power balance 3.4193 3.0782 5.0982∗ 5.966∗ 5.2988∗
(2.4250) (2.6083) (2.4433) (2.789) (2.4244)
Power balance (sq.) −4.3510 −4.8846 −6.7212 −8.176∗ −7.0736∗
(3.0444) (3.5827) (3.5345) (4.038) (3.5706)
Country-level variables
GDP/capita (log) −0.4501∗ −0.8442∗∗∗ −0.8639∗∗∗ −0.9106∗∗∗ −0.8873∗∗∗
(0.1840) (0.2254) (0.2237) (0.2351) (0.2313)
No. excluded groups −0.0132 −0.0399∗ −0.0524∗∗ −0.0578∗∗ −0.0511∗∗
(0.0171) (0.0185) (0.0158) (0.2955) (0.0168)
Year −0.1772∗∗ −0.2166∗∗ −0.2146∗∗∗ −0.2213∗∗∗ −0.2111∗∗∗
(0.0568) (0.0602) (0.0590) (0.4816) (0.0592)
Group-level conflict history
Peace years −0.0190 0.1434 0.1482 0.1601 0.1540
(0.1071) (0.1106) (0.1040) (0.109) (0.1038)
Spline 1 0.0007 0.0022 0.0025∗ 0.0026∗ 0.0026∗
(0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Spline 2 −0.0005 −0.0013 −0.0016∗ −0.0017∗ −0.0016∗
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (−0.0008) (0.0007)
Spline 3 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Constant 353.3482∗∗ 434.7015∗∗∗ 429.9920∗∗∗ 443.7∗∗∗ 422.0450∗∗∗
(113.5753) (120.2728) (117.9401) (96.18) (118.2983)
Observations 6,438 3,967 3,967 3,967 3,967
Notes: Robust, country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗p < .001. ∗∗p < .01. ∗p < .05.
except that the coefficient for the num_excl variable
now becomes significant.
Having considered H1, we now test H2, which pos-
tulates that both economic and political HIs increase
the risk of internal conflict. Retaining the size restric-
tion of the previous specification, Model 3 introduces a
dummy variable for excluded groups that has a strong
and statistically discernible impact on onset likelihood.
However, this does not undermine the results with
regard to economic inequality. This is an important
result that strengthens our confidence that different
types of grievances operate together and enables us to
rule out the possibility that economic inequality could
be an artifact of groups’ access to executive power
(and vice versa). Moreover, it is clear that the addition
of the exclusion dummy either preserves or increases
the effect of the other variables.27 We illustrate the
effect of inequality in Figure 5, which indicates how
27 Although both the inequality indicators and the exclusion dummy
have a strong, independent effect in this model specification, adding a
the predicted probability of conflict increases as the
group’s wealth level deviates from the country average
in both directions, for a median observation for the
post-1990 sample, for excluded and included groups,
respectively. The figure reveals that, other things being
equal, excluded groups (see the solid curve) are much
more likely to experience conflict than included ones
(see the dashed curve). However, the increases in risk
from greater relative deviations in economic wealth
are also substantial, especially for an excluded group,
consistent with our argument that both political and
economic grievances increase the risk of conflict.
So far we have made the simplifying, but question-
able, assumption that the effect of inequality is the
same for groups below and above the country’s average
level of wealth. We therefore need to test Hypotheses
multiplicative interactive term does not yield a statistically significant
coefficient. Inequality and exclusion appear to have additive effects,
and the effect of one feature does not depend on the level of the
other.
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FIGURE 5. Predicted Effect of Horizontal Inequality on Probability of Civil War
(See Model 3 of Table 2)
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Note: The solid line corresponds to a median profile for excluded groups; the dashed one to the median profile for included groups. The
horizontal axis is on a log scale, with tick marks indicating specific values of the g/G ratio.
H1a and H1b separately. As a way to do so, Model 4
relaxes the assumption of a parabolic functional form
by relying on a smoothed, spline-based local regression
specification with three knots. Even if not perfectly
symmetric, the estimated functional form shown in Fig-
ure 6 tells us that both relatively poorer and wealthier
groups are more likely to experience civil war, thus
confirming both H1a and H1b. The error bands are
relatively broad but clearly separate from zero, at least
for the poorer groups.28
Further increasing our confidence in the separate
effects, Model 5 uses the two linear ratio indicators
low_ratio and high_ratio while still controlling for po-
litical exclusion. The results are strongly positive for
both directions of inequality, lending further support
to H1a and H1b. With this model specification, the
demographic measures of power balance also become
significant in the expected direction. Furthermore, the
impact of the control variables at the country level also
becomes stronger compared to Model 3.
28 Because Model 4 was estimated as a GAM in R without clustered
standard errors, these cannot be directly compared with the other
models.
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Because the number of onsets is quite limited, our
findings need to be treated with some caution. There-
fore, the current section presents the results of sev-
eral robustness checks. Table 3 introduces four mod-
els that evaluate different sensitivity aspects. As noted
earlier, the GDP per capita data used in the article
include all economic activity, including exploitation of
raw material. This in itself does not necessarily un-
dermine a grievance interpretation, especially where
disadvantaged groups are deprived of the riches ex-
tracted from their homelands (Østby, Norda˚s, and Rød
2009, 307; Stewart, Brown and Langer 2008, 346). Ex-
amples include the Aceh in Indonesia (Ross 2005)
and the Ijaw in Nigeria (Osaghae 2008). Although
our data sources do not enable us to separate a pure
grievance effect from the low_ratio and high_ratio vari-
ables, Model 6 reports the coefficients of these vari-
ables, excluding wealth deriving from oil production,
based on data from Nordhaus’s dataset. The results
tell us that the conflict-proneness of wealthy groups
is not primarily driven by oil income. In fact, once
oil income has been subtracted, the coefficient of
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FIGURE 6. Effect of Logged Horizontal Inequality on the Probability of Civil War
(See Model 4 of Table 2)
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high_ratio increases considerably compared to that in
Model 5.29
We continue the sensitivity analysis by extending the
sample back to 1946. Although we prefer to base our
conclusions on the period explicitly following the point
of measurement, this backward projection of inequal-
ity values is not completely unreasonable, because of
the already noted durability of inequality. In any case,
this rough robustness test tells us whether the findings
should be seen as an artifact of the post–Cold War sam-
ple or whether they can be potentially generalized be-
yond this time period. Extending the sample of Model
3 to the entire post-WWII period, Model 7 reveals that
the main inequality result holds in this case as well.30
Because the Nordhaus data represent a temporal
snapshot, there are also reasons to be concerned that
endogeneity could have distorted the results. We there-
fore discard all groups that were experiencing ongo-
ing conflict in 1990, which could have affected these
groups’ relative wealth estimates. The results of this
29 A simple test (not shown) based on a dummy variable that indi-
cates whether the group’s settlement area intersects with oil fields
also fails to make any substantial difference in the effect of the in-
equality variables (see data at http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets).
30 Similar results can be derived by extending the sample in Model
5 (see Model 11 in the supplemental online Appendix).
test are presented in Model 8, which indicates that
the inequality effect reported in Model 3 cannot be
dismissed as being driven by endogenous influences. In
fact, the coefficient of lineq2 hardly changes at all and
remains discernibly greater than zero, and the other
variables behave in a fashion very similar to that in the
original model.31
Finally, to rule out potentially distorting temporal
dependencies, we present a static model that uses the
group list in 1992 as the basis of comparison, while
coding the dependent variable as one if there is any
group-level onset from 1992 through 2005.32 Again,
we find that the inequality result in Model 8 becomes
even stronger than in the dynamic models. As would
be expected, however, the exclusion dummy loses sig-
nificance, because this measure is sensitive to shifts of
groups’ power access that cannot be captured by the
static analysis. We find no positive result for the power
31 Despite this result, endogeneity may of course still undermine
causal inference, although we believe this to be less likely given the
stability of economic HIs (see Section 1.5 in the supplemental online
Appendix).
32 Very similar results can be obtained based on the 1991 and 1993
data, but we prefer to focus on 1992 because this is the first year
after the collapse of the Soviet Union (cf. Models 18a and 18b in the
supplemental online Appendix).
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TABLE 3. Explaining the Onset of Group-level Conflict (Sensitivity Analysis)
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Group-level variables
Ineq. (low excl. oil) 1.2498∗∗∗
−0.2045
Ineq. (high excl. oil) 1.5140∗∗∗
−0.4134
Inequality (lineq2) 0.6586∗∗∗ 1.7217∗∗∗ 2.0801∗∗∗
(0.1377) (0.2570) (0.4978)
Excluded 1.2285∗∗∗ 1.3844∗∗∗ 1.0372∗∗ 0.7021
(0.3493) (0.2551) (0.3679) (0.4422)
Power balance 5.4835∗ 0.8590 4.8040 −1.3843
(2.6084) (1.9322) (2.7512) (2.5962)
Power balance (sq.) −7.4488 −0.8995 −6.2409 1.2222
(3.9224) (2.1901) (3.7091) (3.0177)
Country-level variables
GDP/capita (log) −0.9385∗∗∗ −0.4880∗∗∗ −0.7987∗∗ −0.901∗∗
(0.2391) (0.1478) (0.2660) (0.2606)
No. excluded groups −0.0573∗∗ −0.0199 −0.0508∗∗ −0.0880∗
(0.0184) (0.0123) (0.0148) (0.0370)
Year −0.2079∗∗∗ 0.0515∗∗ −0.2242∗∗
(0.0596) (0.0172) (0.0685)
Post–Cold War period 362.526∗∗∗
(86.3212)
Year × Post–Cold War −0.1819∗∗∗
(0.0433)
Group-level conflict history
Peace years 0.1620 −0.0797 −0.0108
(0.1068) (0.0899) (0.1046)
Spline 1 0.0026∗ 0.0006 0.0012
(0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0011)
Spline 2 −0.0016∗ −0.0008 −0.0008
(0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0008)
Spline 3 0.0004 0.0004∗ 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Constant 415.5265∗∗∗ −102.798∗∗ 449.2955∗∗ 4.6684∗
(118.9090) (33.6938) (137.1074) (1.9423)
Observations 3,967 13,550 3,743 286
Notes: Robust, country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗p < .001. ∗∗p < .01. ∗p < .05.
balance, but the two remaining country-level variables
retain a statistically significant negative effect.
Obviously, this set of sensitivity tests does not ex-
haust all possibilities. We refer the reader to our supple-
mental online Appendix for detailed results, but report
here on the most important findings. For example, dis-
aggregation of the dependent variable into territorial
and governmental conflict, based on the contested in-
compatibility, shows that it is really the former type that
is influenced by our inequality indicators. This is to be
expected, because our method is explicitly geography-
dependent, and it therefore cannot be excluded that
HIs trigger governmental onsets. However, confirming
this would require complementing the current mea-
surements with nonspatial information, for example,
from surveys.33
33 See specifically the multinomial analysis presented in Model 10 in
the supplemental online Appendix. Another potential concern is that
We also conducted several sensitivity tests by remov-
ing extreme values, both among the (resource-)richest
groups, such as the Ijaw in Nigeria and Arabs in Iran,
and among the relatively poorest groups, such as the
Chechens in Russia. Even if discarding these groups
separately or together weakens the results, the inequal-
ity effect remains statistically significant and strong. We
also ran models controlling for world regions, which
further confirm the robustness of our findings. Further-
more, another test that entails replacing the dummy
variable for excluded groups with the full set of EPR
the inequality effect could be driven by the difference between urban
and rural communities. Yet this distinction does not in principle
contradict our theory, and even though the GeoEPR data do not
trace the ethnic compositions of major urban areas, adding a control
variable for whether a group is “rural and urban” as opposed to
merely “rural” does not affect our results (cf. Section 1.3 in the
supplemental online Appendix).
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categories also makes little difference to the impact of
inequality.
CONCLUSION
Although there is plenty of room for further data re-
finement in future research, we believe that the results
presented in this article are both of considerable the-
oretical importance and of direct policy relevance. To
our knowledge, this is the first study of civil wars that
compares economic horizontal inequality at the global
level. Our main result shows that ethnic groups both
above and below the country average in terms of per
capita income are overrepresented in civil conflict, thus
confirming what previous studies have already found
within a more limited scope based on case-study re-
search, survey data, and other sources.
In keeping with previous studies, our empirical anal-
ysis also detects a strong influence of political hori-
zontal inequality based on measures of ethnic groups’
access to central executive power (see, e.g., Cederman,
Wimmer, and Min 2010). This effect, which operates
along with the influence of economic HIs, confirms
Stewart’s multidimensional notion of HI and strength-
ens our confidence in grievance-based explanations of
conflict in general. Although such explanations have
partly fallen out of favor in recent civil war research,
this finding will hopefully contribute to convincing
scholars of civil war that the frustrations driving eth-
nonationalist mobilization and violence cannot be sep-
arated easily from economic factors. If it were correct
that grievances do not matter because of their alleged
omnipresence, then there should be no statistical link
between structural inequalities and civil war onsets.
However, our research shows that there is such a con-
nection, thus implying that it is premature to reject
grievance-based explanations of civil war onset.
Yet it should be kept in mind that, even though
our study is more disaggregated than the custom-
ary country-level proxies used in quantitative civil
war research, the group-level analysis presented here
also hinges on theoretical interpolation to connect
structural inequalities with collective-level violence.
Although our proposed causal mechanisms are po-
tentially capable of closing this explanatory gap, we
cannot provide direct evidence of their operation in
this article. Beyond citing separate case studies in con-
firmation of these mechanisms, it would be desirable
to improve and expand existing datasets such that in-
teractions between incumbent governments and their
challengers can be traced in greater detail, while rely-
ing on systematic information on repression and mo-
bilization before violence breaks out (see, e.g., Sam-
banis and Zinn 2006). Building on the pioneering ef-
forts of Gurr (1993; 2000b) and his team, who have
also collected extensive data on social and cultural
HIs, such information would help disentangle the pro-
cess at lower levels of aggregation and help us es-
tablish whether the causal imputations remain robust
to such scrutiny. Fine-grained temporal measurements
could also help developing an explicitly endogenous
account of HIs, which have been kept exogenous in this
study.
Another important caveat concerns the dependency
on imperfect, geocoded data. Although innovative,
our spatial method is limited to territorially segre-
gated groups, and therefore cannot measure nonspa-
tial, economic HI, as in the case of the Hutu and
Tutsi in Rwanda. Although survey-based information
has limited scope, it could be used to extend and
validate our measurements (see Baldwin and Huber
2010).
To a large extent, our research agenda coincides with
Blattman and Miguel’s (2010, 18) recommendation:
At present, the economic motivations for conflict are
better theorized than psychological or sociological fac-
tors. Individual preferences in existing models typically
include only material rewards and punishments. One key
implication is that we have not derived the falsifiable
predictions that distinguish between material and non-
material theoretical accounts. Yet the greater degree of
existing theory on economic factors does not imply that
researchers should discard non-economic explanations for
conflict.
Rejecting “messy” factors, such as grievances and
inequalities, may lead to more elegant models that can
be more easily tested, but the fact remains that some
of the most intractable and damaging conflict processes
in the contemporary world, such as the conflicts afflict-
ing the Sudan or the former Yugoslavia, are to a large
extent about political and economic injustice. It is very
unlikely that such conflicts can ever be understood,
let alone durably solved, without taking seriously the
claims of marginalized populations.
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APPENDIX
Cases of Conflict Onset
Country Group Year Type >500k
Afghanistan Pashtuns 1992 GOV ∗
Afghanistan Tajiks 1992 GOV ∗
Afghanistan Uzbeks 1992 GOV ∗
Afghanistan Tajiks 1996 GOV ∗
Afghanistan Hazaras 1996 GOV ∗
Afghanistan Uzbeks 1996 GOV ∗
Angola Bakongo 1991 TERR ∗
Angola Cabindan Mayombe 1991 TERR
Azerbaijan Armenians 1992 TERR
Bosnia and Herzegovina Serbs 1992 TERR
Bosnia and Herzegovina Croats 1993 TERR ∗
Central African Republic Yakoma 2001 GOV
Congo Lari/Bakongo 1998 GOV
Cote d’Ivoire Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur) 2002 GOV ∗
Cote d’Ivoire Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur) 2004 GOV ∗
Croatia Serbs 1992 TERR
DRC Tutsi Banyamulenge 1996 GOV ∗
DRC Tutsi Banyamulenge 1998 GOV ∗
Eritrea Muslims 1997 GOV ∗
Eritrea Muslims 2003 GOV ∗
Ethiopia Afar 1996 TERR ∗
Ethiopia Somali (Ogaden) 1996 TERR ∗
Ethiopia Oroma 1999 TERR ∗
Georgia Abkhazians 1992 TERR
Georgia Ossetians (South) 1992 TERR
India Indigenous Tripuri 1992 TERR
India Naga 1992 TERR ∗
Indonesia East Timorese 1992 TERR ∗
Indonesia East Timorese 1997 TERR ∗
Indonesia Achinese 1999 TERR ∗
Iraq Shi’a Arabs 1991 GOV ∗
Macedonia Albanians 2001 GOV
Mali Whites (Tuareg and Arabs) 1994 TERR ∗
Mexico Indigenous peoples 1994 GOV ∗
Moldova Transnistrians 1992 TERR ∗
Myanmar Muslim Arakanese 1991 TERR ∗
Myanmar Mons 1996 TERR ∗
Myanmar Wa 1997 TERR ∗
Nepal Ethnic communities (Adivasi/Janajati) 1996 GOV ∗
Niger Tuareg 1992 TERR ∗
Niger Toubou 1996 TERR
Niger Tuareg 1997 TERR ∗
Nigeria Ijaw 2004 TERR ∗
Pakistan Mohajirs 1995 GOV
Russia Chechens 1994 TERR ∗
Russia Chechens 1999 TERR ∗
Spain Basques 1991 TERR ∗
Tajikistan Uzbeks 1998 GOV ∗
Togo Kabre´ (and related groups) 1991 GOV ∗
Uganda Langi/Acholi 1994 GOV ∗
United Kingdom Catholics in Northern Ireland 1998 TERR
Yemen Southerners 1994 TERR ∗
Yugoslavia Croats 1991 TERR ∗
Yugoslavia Slovenes 1991 TERR ∗
Yugoslavia Albanians 1998 TERR ∗
∗ Onset involving groups with population larger than 500,000 (see Models 2–9).
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